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Are Workmen's Compensation Cases
Triable in Federal District Courts?*
CHARLES B. WALLACEt
It can be fairly estimated that the legal profession as a whole
is now realizing nearly one-half of its annual gross revenue from
handling matters before state and federal administrative agen-
cies. This percentage probably will not decrease greatly even
after the complete removal of wartime restrictions and regula-
tions.
It is evident that administrative law is of rapidly increasing
importance. The reasons for the passage of the recent Adminis-
trative Procedure Act,' emphasize the need for uniform federal
review of the mass of federal administrative orders.
Most lawyers primarily trained in courthouse procedure
want to know: Will state courts review state administrative or-
ders? Will federal courts review federal administrative orders?
Will federal courts review state administrative orders?
A fairly recent United States Supreme Court case has
squarely raised the question of judicial review of the orders of
state administrative bodies by federal district courts. Unfortu-
nately, the case leaves its own inquiry open.
It is the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in
Burford v. Sun Oil Conpany which has posed the question:
"This is not just an isolated case. To order the dismissal
of this litigation, on this record and in the present state of
the Texas law, is not merely to decide that the federal court
in Travis County, Texas, should no longer entertain suits
brought under the Texas conservation laws. We are holding,
in effect, that the enforcement of state rights created by state
legislation and affecting state policies is limited to the state
courts. It means, candidly, that we should re-examine all of
* Part of the material in this article was used in a speech before the
Dallas Bar Association, Dallas, Texas, March 3, 1945.
t Part-time member of faculty, Southern Methodist University School of
Law. Legal Department, Safety Casualty Company and Magnolia Petroleum
Company.
1. Pub. L. No. 404, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).
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the cases-and there have been many-since the Reagan deci-
sion almost half a century ago. Do we not owe it to the lower
federal courts, for example, to tell them where a case like
Texas Pipe Line Co. v. Ware, 8 Cir., 15 F. 2d 171, now stands?
In that case the federal court entertained a suit to enforce
rights arising under a state workmen's compensation law.
Would it be error for a federal judge to do so today?" (Italics
supplied. ) 2
An answer to the question of Mr. Justice Frankfurter invites
an inquiry into the whole field of judicial review of administra-
tive orders, but it is thought that a study of the underlying prin-
ciples of one tract will give a clearer concept of the entire prob-
lem. It so happens that workmen's compensation orders afford
an ideal cross-section of state boards and commissions involved in
federal judicial review because the order allowing or disallowing
compensation is usually made by an administrative board fre-
quently exercising a combination of administrative, executive, ju-
dicial and legislative powers.
This discussion of the circumstances under which workmen's
compensation cases may be triable in federal district courts has
been approached first, from the standpoint that federal jurisdic-
2. Dissenting opinion, Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315, 345, 63 S.Ct.
1098, 1113, 87 L.Ed. 1424, 1441 (1943).
Texas Pipe Line Co. v. Ware, 15 F.(2d) 171 (C.C.A. 8th, 1926), cert. denied
273 U. S. 742, 47 S.Ct. 335, 71 L.Ed. 869 (.1926), was a case originally filed in
an Arkansas state court but which was removed by the defendant to the
Federal District Court. The action sought workmen's compensation based
on the Louisiana statutes. The lower federal court allowed this compensation
on the ground that the Louisiana statutes could be enforced in the courts of
a foreign jurisdiction. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held, and cer-
tiorari was denied, that the trial court rightly proceeded to try the case in
Arkansas under Louisiana's compensation statutes.
The Reagan case, mentioned by Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent, is the
case of Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362, 14 S.Ct. 1047, 38
L.Ed. 1014 (1894). In this dissent, Mr. Justice Frankfurter said of the
Reagan case: "On April 3, 1891, the Texas Legislature enacted a statute
creating the Texas Railroad Commission. Section 6 provided that suits to
set aside Commission orders could be brought 'in a court of competent juris-
diction in Travis County, Texas.' Acts Tex. 1891, c. 51, Vernon's Ann. Civ.
St. Tex. Art. 6453. And naturally enough the question soon arose whether this
provision prevented review in the federal court sitting in Travis County."
(319 U. S. 315, 342, 63 S.Ct. 1098, 1111, 87 L.Ed. 1424, 1439.) In allowing federal
review the Supreme Court of the United States, by unanimous decision in
1894, held in the Reagan case: "The language of this provision [Section 6
of the 1891 statute] is significant. It does not name the court in which the
suit may be brought. It is not a court of Travis County but in Travis County.
The language, differing from that which ordinarily would be used to describe
a court of the state, was selected, apparently, in order to avoid the objection
of an attempt to prevent the jurisdiction of the federal courts." (1-54 U. S.
362, 392, 14 S.Ct. 1047, 1052, 38 L.Ed. 1014, 1021.)
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
tion requires that the remedy provided under the state laws be
judicial in nature and not administrative in character; second,
from the proposition that the jurisdiction to be exercised by the
federal court must be original jurisdiction and not a mere attempt
at an appeal from workmen's compensation boards exercising
either judicial or administrative functions; third, from the prem-
ise that federal jurisdiction may be affected by jurisdictional and
venue provisions prescribed by the state in its constitution or
statutes; fourth, by an analysis of the ways in which workmen's
compensation cases may be filed in the federal district court and
the problems incident to the obtaining of federal jurisdiction;
fifth, by an examination of extraterritoriality and conflict of laws
in workmen's compensation cases in the federal courts; sixth,
from the possibility that the development of rule making powers
by workmen's compensation commissions may affect the jurisdic-
tion of federal courts; and seventh, from the postulate of the in-
applicability of the doctrine of abstention to workmen's compen-
sation cases which would have been on the law docket prior to
the adoption of the present federal rules of civil procedure. It
will be assumed that there is a proper diversity of citizenship
and that an amount of over three thousand dollars is involved.
I. THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE PROCEEDINGS BE JUDICIAL, NOT
ADMINISTRATIVE
To be cognizable by a federal court, a proceeding must be a
"case or controversy" as distinguished from the exercise of legis-
lative power or the exercise of a purely administrative function.'
The distinction between administrative and judicial tribunals
does not rest in the nature of the judicial function, but in the
manner in which that function is applied.4 The fact that the pro-
ceeding is carried on in a "court" eo no'mie is not enough;' this
3. Upshur County v. Rich, 135 U. S. 467, 10 S.Ct. 651, 34 L.Ed. 196 (1890).
Cf. Road District v. St. Louis Southwestern Railway, 257 U. S. 547, 42 S.Ct.
250, 66 L.Ed. 364 (1922). For other cases in which the question of what con-
stitutes a "suit" has been considered see' Weston v. City of Charleston, 27
U. S. 449, 7 L.Ed. 481 (1829); Kendall v. United States, 37 U. S. 524, 9 L.Ed.
1181 (1838); Kohle v. United States, 91 U. S. 367, 23 L.Ed. 449 (1875);. Gaines
v. Fuentes, 92 U. S. 10, 23 L.Ed. 524 (1875); Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U. S.
403, 25 L.Ed. 206 (1878); Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, 115 U. S. 1, 5 S.Ct.
1113, 29 L.Ed. 319 (1884); Sear] v. School District, 124 U. S. 197, 8 S.Ct. 460,
31 L.Ed. 415 (1887); Delaware County v. Diebold Safe Co., 133 U. S. 473, 10
S.Ct. 399, 33 L.Ed. 674 (1889).
4. Comment (1936) 24 Calif. L. Rev. 328, 330.
5. Road District v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 257 U. S. 547, 42 S.Ct. 250, 66 L.Ed.
364 (1922).
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body must be invested with judicial functions, and the proceed-
ings before it must have the elements of a judicial controversy;'
that is, adversary parties and an issue to be determined in which
the claim of one party is stated and answered in some form of
pleading.7 The federal courts are not precluded from taking jur-
isdiction by a decision of the state court that the proceedings are
administrative," but the state decisions are entitled to serious
consideration.9 Whether federal courts will try workmen's com-
pensation cases arising under state statutes, therefore, necessi-
tates the inquiry of whether the review provided for orders of
workmen's compensation commissions or industrial accident
boards is judicial in character, since the federal district court
will not take jurisdiction of proceedings originating before admin-
istrative boards unless the question involved presents itself as a
"case" of judicial cognizance. The constitutionality of compen-
sation acts, the doctrine of extraterritoriality, injuries occurring
on navigable waters, injuries occurring in interstate commerce,
and injuries occurring on land owned by the federal government
present examples of the problems arising where the federal
courts take jurisdiction and federal supremacy can no longer be
questioned. e
The question as to the manner in which the order of the
compensation board is reviewed will lead in turn to an inquiry
into the separation of powers of the state government as declared
in its constitution and statutes and in order to ascertain the
source, scope and nature of the authority of the compensation
board. The separation and distribution of state power is a ques-
tion for the state itself.1 1 There is nothing to hinder the state, in-
sofar as the federal constitution is concerned, from dividing gov-
6. Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U.S. 10, 23 L.Ed. 524 (1875).
7. Road District v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 257 U. S. 547, 557, 42 S.Ct. 250, 66
L.Ed. 364 (1922). This definition was given in Prentis'v. Atlantic Coast Line
Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226, 29 S.Ct. 67, 69, 53 L.Ed. 150, 158 (1908): "A judicial in-
quiry investigates, declares, and enforces liabilities as they stand on present
or past facts and under laws supposed to exist. That is its purpose and end."
8. Road District v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 257 U. S. 547, 42 S.Ct. 250, 66 LEd.
364 (1922).
9. Upshur County v. Rich, 135 U. S. 467, 477, 10 S.Ct. 651, 34 L.Ed. 196(1890). See 3 Moore, Federal Practice (1938) § 101.03.
10. Horovitz, Federal Supremacy in Five Workmen's Compensation Prob-
lems (1944) 24 B.U.L. 109.
11. Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U. S. 608, 57 S.Ct. 549, 81
L.Ed. 835 (1937); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 52 S.Ct. 285, 76 L.Ed. 598
(1931). If jurisdiction is present otherwise, however, the federal courts will
even inquire into state constitutional questions of separation of powers and
delegation of authority. Red "C" Oil Manufacturing Co. v. Board of Agricul-
ture, 222 U. S. 380, 32 S.Ct. 152, 56 L.Ed. 240 (1911).
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ernmental powers among more or less than the traditional three
departments of government. Neither is there any substantial
federal question raised merely because of a delegation of author-
ity to or a blending or commingling of powers among state agen-
cies.12 Some states, in fact, have provided for a blending of some
governmental powers. 1 Some state constitutions expressly author-
ize courts to exercise administrative power,14 while in other state
constitutions, administrative power, as such, is impliedly ex-
cluded. 15
Administration is not capable of close definition because it
may overlap both the legislative field and the judicial field. 6 But
the workmen's compensation board is definitely not of a legis-
lative character and it is not exercising a delegated legislative
function in passing upon claims for workmen's compensation.
Neither is the board ordinarily executive in character. Most
boards administering workmen's compensaton by passing upon
claims for compensation in the first instance provide themselves
with a seal, issue notices and process, summon witnesses, admin-
ister oaths, conduct hearings, take testimony and have it tran-
scribed, weigh evidence, make rulings on law and facts, and
render awards which may be enforced in the regular courts.
Some compensation boards have been held to exist primarily for
the adjudication of controversies arising between parties over the
payment of compensation under the compensation act, 7 and
complete judicial weight is given to the decisions of the board.'"
Where the constitution and statutes have not set up the work-
men's compensation board or commission as a court, the agency
is substantially administrative in its nature, although it is fre-
quently vested with :some legislative, judicial and executive func-
tions. Such boards, while exercising predominantly administra-
tive powers, render awards which by statute become justiciable
in the courts after rendition. In those few states in which no
12. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 210, 29 S. Ct. 67, 53 L.
Ed. 150 (1908).
13. Opinion of Justices, 87 N.H. 492, 179 Atl. 344 (1935); Rainey v. Michel,
6 Cal. (2d) 259, 57 P.(2d) 932 (1936); Denver v. Lynch, 92 Colo. 102, 18 P.(2d)
907 (1932); Oklahoma Cotton Ginners' Assoc. v. State, 174 Okla. 243, 51 P.(2d)
327 (1935).
14. Ind. Const. Art. 3, § 1; Financial Aid Corp. v. Wallace, 216 Ind. 114,
23 N.E. (2d) 472 (1932).
15. Harmon v. State, 66 Ohio St. 249, 64 N.E. 117 (1902).
16. See Green, Separation of Governmental Powers (1920) 29 Yale LJ.
369, 874.
17. Carstens v. Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 572, 158 Pac. 218 (1916).
18. Gale, v. Industrial Accident Commission, 211 Cal. 127, 294 Pac. 391
(1930). See Comment (1936) 24 Calif. L. Rev. 328.
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board or commission is provided for the administration of com-
pensation acts, the right and remedy are completely judicial in
nature.
II. THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE JURISDICTION MUST BE ORIGINAL,
NOT APPELLATE
Section 1, Article III, of the Constitution of the United States
provides that the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such inferior courts as Congress may establish. By
Section 2 of Article III the judicial power shall extend to certain
cases and controversies. As we have seen, the federal courts will
take jurisdiction only if the case or controversy is judicial and
the federal courts will not take jurisdiction if the case or con-
troversy is merely administrative. The federal district court is a
"legislative" court and as sucl-r has original jurisdiction of judicial
cases and controversies only."0
Assuming that the jurisdiction of the federal district court is
invoked-as a court of original jurisdiction, and assuming that no
equitable principles are involved, but the suit is merely for a
sum of money as compensation with the defenses limited to such
matters as scope of employment, accidental injury, extent of
injury, duration of injury, wage scale, et cetera, the state statute
,creating workmen's compensation will largely determine whether
or not a United States district court will try a workmen's com-
pensation insurance case.0 In most states the claim is first pre-
sented to some sort of an administrative board for a hearing and
an award. While some state statutes designate the suit brought
19. 28 U.S.C.A. § 41(1).
20. Exemplary damages are distinct from the ordinary claim for work-
men's compensation and therefore are not subject to prior presentation be-
fore administrative boards before suit can be brought thereon in a federal
court: Martin v. Consolidated Casualty Ins. Co., 138 F.(2d) 896 (C.C.A. 5th,
1943).. Questions involving splitting of these causes of action, survival in
death cases, res judicata where the claim for workmen's compensation is
denied or sustained and the proportion which exemplary damages must bear
to actual damages are all beyond the scope of this article.
So, in Oklahoma, actions involving deaths are not compensable [Okla.
Stat. Ann. (1938) tit. 85, § 121], and no bar exists to trying such cases in
federal courts, assuming other jurisdictional facts. The same is true of ac-
cidents in certain fields not defined as hazardous [Id. at § 2].
Subrogation claims arising out of workmen's compensation payments are
likewise not dealt with herein.
All states now, except Mississippi, have enacted some sort of workmen's
compensation laws.
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after the administrative award as an "appeal, ' '21 nevertheless such
suits may be in fact original suits in the first instance and are not
appellate in their nature.2 2 Assuming diversity of citizenship and
a sufficient amount involved, especially where such suits bring
all matters up for trial de novo, 28 where no vestige of the admin-
istrative award remains and where no subsequent supervision or
working partnership arrangement exists by and between the
court and the administrative board,2 4 the federal district court
21. Hawaii [Hawaii Rev. Laws (1935) § 7518]; Maryland [Md. Ann. Code
(Flack, 1939) art. 101, § 701; Montana [Mont. Rev. Codes (1935) § 2959-2962];
Nebraska [Neb. Comp. Stat. (Supp. 1941) § 48-174]; North Dakota [N.D.
Comp. Laws Ann. (Supp. 1926) § 396a17]; Oregon [Ore. Comp. Laws Ann.
(1940) § 102-17741; Rhode Island [R.I. Rev. Gen. Laws (1923) § 12441; Texas
(Tex. Ann. Rev. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1935) art. 8307, § 5]; Vermont [Vt. Pub.
Laws (1933) § 6549]; Washington [Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington 1933)
§ 7697-21.
In North Dakota and Oregon, appeals are expressly limited-to claimants
only. Most of the references to state statutes are taken from Schneider,
Workmen's Compensation Statutes (1941).
22. See note 21, supra. This is true in all states mentioned except Ne-
braska, where the appeal is somewhat limited in its scope. This may be true
of Montana.
23. See notes 21 and 22, supra. This is unqualifiedly true as to Hawaii,
Maryland, North Dakota, Rhode Island and Texas. In Oregon, only issues
raised in the 'rehearing before the Commission may be presented. In Ver-
mont, only the issues certified by the commissioner may be heard. In Wash-
ington, no new evidence may be presented. In Montana, the court may for
good cause permit additional evidence not introduced before the Board to
be heard; other than this, the trial is wholly de novo.
24. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315, 63 S. Ct. 1098, 87 L. Ed. 1424
(1943).
In many states the reviewing courts may exercise close supervision over
the workmen's compensation board or commission. Typical of this "work-
ing partner" arrangement is the statute-created right of certifying questions,
of remanding the case by the courts for obedience to the court's judgment,
or for further consideration by the board:
Arkansas [Ark. Dig. Stat. (Pope. 1937) § 8559]; California [Calif. Civ.
Code (Deering, 1937) § 59531; Delaware [Del. Rev. Code (1935) c. 175, § 55];
Florida [Fla. Stat. Ann. (1943) § 440.271; Georgia [Ga. Code Ann. (Park, et
al., 1936) tit. 114, § 710(5)]; Illinois [ill. Stat. Ann. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 48,
§ 156]; Iowa [Iowa Code (1935) § 1454]; Kentucky [Ky. Rev. Stat. (1942)
§ 342.285]; Minnesota [Minn. Stat. (Mason, Supp. 1936) § 4321]; Missouri
[Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1942) § 37321; Oregon (Ore. Code Ann. (1930) § 49-1843];
Pennsylvania [Pa. Stat. (Purdon, 1939) tit. 71, § 871 et seq.]; South Dakota
[S. D. Code (1935) § 64.0701]; Vermont [Vt. Pub. Laws (1933) § 6550]; West
Virginia [W. Va. Code Ann. (Michie & Sublett, 1937) § 2545(2)]; Wisconsin
[Wis. Stat. (1939) § 102.24].
The same result is reached by court decisions in the absence of statute
in such states as: Connecticut [Conn. Gen. Stats. (1930), court construction
of Section 5266] North Carolina [N. C. Code Ann. (Michie, 1935), court con-
struction of Section 8081(pp)]; Oklahoma [Okla. Stat. Ann. (1936), court con-
struction of Title 85, Section 29].
By statute in some states the board may certify questions of law to state
courts: Hawaii [Hawaii Rev. Laws (1935) § 7518]; Indiana [nd. Stat. Ann.
(Burns, 1940) § 40-1512]; New York [N. Y. Consolidated Laws of 1914, c. 67,
§ 60]; North Carolina [N. C. Code Ann. (Michie & Stedman 1035) § 601; Ver-
mont [Vt. Pub. Laws (1933) § 6549]; Virginia [Va. Workmen's Compensation
Law, § 61]; West Virginia [W. Va. Code Ann. (Michie & Sublett, 1937) §
2545(3)].
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has and will assume full jurisdiction to hear and try a case
arising under the workmen's compensation laws of the state in
question.
Where the review of the board's order is in effect appellate
in its nature, the federal court, of course, would have no jurisdic-
tion since the United States District Court's jurisdiction is origi-
nal in its nature and state statutes cannot confer appellate juris-
diction on or enlarge the jurisdiction of these federal courts.",
Where the workmen's compensation law is so inseparable
from and united with the remedy provided as to make its en-
forcement necessary by a particular method and in a particular
tribunal, the United States District Court would have no juris-
diction to try a workmen's compensation case."6 Ultimate review
by the Supreme Court of the United States is preserved by cer-
tiorari from the decision of the highest state court.
Where no board or commission is set up in the workmen's
compensation machinery, but a mere cause of action given by
it with no implication that the enforcement of this right is re-
stricted to state courts alone, then it is clear that, with the diver-
sity of citizenship and with sufficient amount involved,2 8 the
United States District Court would have jurisdiction of such
claim.2 1
25. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315, 63 S. Ct. 1098, 87 L. Ed. 1424
(1943).
26. Texas Pipe Line Co. v. Ware, 15 F. (2d) 171 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926),
cert. denied 273 U. S. 742, 47 S. Ct. 335, 71 L. Ed. 869 (1926); Tennessee Coal
Co. v. George, 233 U.S. 354, 359, 34 S. Ct. 587, 58 L. Ed. 997 (1914); Galveston
Ry. v. Wallace, 223 U.S. 481, 490, 32 S. Ct. 205, 56 L.Ed. 516 (1917); Stewart
v. B. & Co. Ry., 168 U.S. 445, 18 S. Ct. 105, 42 L. Ed. 537 (1897); Snook v.
Industrial Commission of Illinois, 9 F. Supp. 26 (D. C. Ill. 1934).
27. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315, 63 St. Ct. 1098, 87 L. Ed. 1424
(1943).
28. Under Louisiana statutes providing for permissive review every six
months (on the grounds of increasing or diminishing in incapacity) of a
court's judgment awarding weekly installment payments [Dart's Stats.
(1939) §§ 4391-4434], a federal court has recently held that it had no juris-
diction where the amount of any final judgment which it could render dur-
ing any six months period would be far less than $3,000.00. Godfrey v. Brown
Paper Mill Co., Inc., 52 F. Supp. 926 (D. C. La., 1943). Contra: Blount v. Kan-
sas City Southern Ry., 5 F. (2d) 967 (D. C. La., 1925); McLaughlin v. West-
ern Union Telegraph Co., 7 F. (2d) 177 (D. C. La., 1925), affirmed 17 F. (2d)
574 (D. C. La., 1927). A federal district court from Alabama, in a case in-
volving the compensation laws of that state, has cited and followed the latter
cases, Barrett v. Consolidated Coal Co., 65 F. Supp. 291 (D. C. Ala., 1946).
29. Alabama [Ala. Code (1940) Title 26, § 304]; Alaska [Alaska Comp.
Laws (1933) § 2184]; Louisiana [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4408]; New Hampshire
[N. H. Pub. Laws (1926) c. 178, §§ 25-30]; New Mexico [N. M. Comp. Stat.
Ann. (Courtright, 1929), Comm. c. 156, § 13]; Wyoming [Wyo. Rev. Stats.
(1931) § 124-113]; Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U. S. C. A. 51, 56
(1943).
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While no workmen's compensation cases have been found,
one or more of these sometimes overlapping reasons have been
offered for federal courts of original jurisdiction abstaining from
taking jurisdiction in related fields:
1. Where a decision would determine or .shape state
policy;3°
2. Where a decision would interfere with state admin-
istrative agencies;31
3. Where a decision would interfere with state courts,
especially if another case is pending in the state court involv-
ing substantially the same issues between substantially the
same parties;3 2
4. In some exceptional instances, where the equity
power, and therefore discretion, of the federal court is in-
voked;3 3
5. Where a decision would make the federal court a
working partner with or supervisor over the state workmen's
compensation board;"4
6. Where the lower federal court would act as an appel-
late tribunal sitting in review of a state administrative
agency;"
7. Where the state statute has confined review to a par-
ticular named court or in some circumstances restricted venue
so as to effect the same result;"
8. Where the state law has interwoven the right and
remedy, thereby made review in the state courts the only
available tribunal; 37
30. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315, 63 S. Ct. 1098, 87 L. Ed. 142.
(1943); Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U. S. 228, 64 S. Ct. 7, 88 L. Ed.
9 (1943).
31. Ibid.; Railroad Commmission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496,
61 S. Ct. 643, 85 L. Ed. 971 (1941).
32. Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U. S. 228, 64 S. Ct. 7, 88 L. Ed.
9 (1943).
33. Ibid.




37. See note 26, supra.
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9. Where suit in the lower federal court on workmen's
compensation would not be consistent with public policy or in
the public interest;31
10. Where decision would pass upon state constitutional
questions;39
11. Where federal decision would result in confusion; 40
12. Where state judicial review is expeditious and ade-
quate;41
13. Where no review is provided by the state legisla-
ture;
4 2
14. Where United States Supreme Court review, at least
on federal constitutional questions, is preserved;"
15. Where a jury trial is actually or inferentially ex-
cluded by state statute;"
United States District Courts will take jurisdiction of work-
men's compensation cases where:
1. In a judicial, as distinguished from administrative,
proceeding, trial is wholly de novo, either on "appeal" or orig-
inally;45
2. Complete relief may be granted or denied by the fed-
eral court;16
3. No supervision or working arrangement is required
between the federal court and the state agency; 47 and
38. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315, 63 S. Ct. 1098, 87 L. Ed. 1424
(1943); Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U. S. 228, 64 S. Ct. 7, 88 L. Ed.
9 (1943).
39. Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, 316 U. S. 168 (1942).
40. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315, 63 S. Ct. 1098, 87 L. Ed. 1424
(1943).
41. Ibid.
42. Switchmen's Union of North America v. National Mediation Board, 320
U.S. 297, 64 S. Ct. 95, 88 L. Ed. 61 (1943); Nevada Act of March 13, 1915, c.
111, §§ 1-51, as amended. But see Dahlquist v. Nevada Industrial Commis-
sion, 46 Nev. 107, 206 Pac. 197 (1922), 46 Nev. 107, 207 Pac. 1104 (1922). Com-
pare Stark v. Wickard, 321 U. S. 288, 64 S. Ct. 559, 88 L. Ed. 733 (1944).
43. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315, 63 S. Ct. 1098, 87 L. Ed. 1424
(1943).
44. Alabama (wilful misconduct only [Ala. Code Ann. (Michie, 1928) §
7578]; Colorado [Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1935) c. 97, § 1051; Delaware [Del.
Rev. Code (1935) § 18, c. 175]; Massachusetts [Mass. Gen. Laws (1932) c.
152, § 11]; Tennessee [Tenn. Code Ann. (Michie, 1938) § 6885].
45. See note 23, supra.
46. Ibid.
47. See note 24, supra.
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4. The right and remedy granted by the state legislature
are not otherwise so interwoven with the state judicial struc-
ture as to prohibit federal jurisdiction. 48
III. EFFECT OF STATE LIMITATIONS UPON JURISDICTION
AND VENUE
Congress has the right to restrict review of administrative
decrees to appellate courts, 4 to restrict review to certain phases
of administrative decrees, 0 and to foreclose resort to the courts
for review at allO ' in the absence of constitutional questions.2
It would appear that review of the decrees of state boards may
be subject to the same limitations by the state legislatures, in
the absence of state constitutional limitations.
Though providing for full de novo review in the court of
record, if the legislative intent is clear, a state statute may
validly restrict the review as a matter of jurisdiction to a certain
named state court,' " providing the right and remedy are inter-
woven, yet it is questionable as to whether a mere limitation on
venue to a certain locality will ever have the effect of restricting
review to state courts only.' 4 In Texas, review of the industrial
48. See note 25, supra.
49. 29 U.S. C. A. § 160(e) (1942). Review of a final order of the National
Labor Relations Board is vested exclusively in the circuit court of appeals
and in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
50. 29 U. S. C. A. § 160(e) (1928). The findings of the National Labor Re-
lations Board, if supported by evidence, are conclusive. As a practical matter
the reviews by these appellate courts are of law questions only.
51. Switchmen's Union of North America v. National Mediation Board,
320 U. S. 297, 64 S. Ct. 95, 88 L. Ed. 61 (1943); General Committee of Adjust-
ment of the Brotherhood of the Locomotive Engineers for the Missouri-
Kansas-Texas Railroad v. Missouri K. & T. Ry., 320 U.S. 323, 64 S. Ct. 146,
88 L. Ed. 76 (1943); General Committee of Adjustment of the Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers for the Pacific Lines of Southern Pacific Co. v.
Southern Pacific Co., 320 U. S. 338, 64 S. Ct., 142, 88 L. Ed. 85 (1943).
But if the claimant has a personal right, as distinguished from mere
general interest, the present Supreme Court would accord him judicial review
of unfavorable administrative orders, if it can possibly be inferred from the
compensation statute, though the legislature created no specific court review.
Stark v. Wickard, 321 U. S. 288, 64 S. Ct. 559, 88 L. Ed. 733 (1944).
52. Ibid..
53. See, for example, such statutes as Ariz. Code Ann. (Bobbs-Merrill,
1939) art. 56-916, which may expressly limit reviews to state superior courts
and the Supreme Court. See also Wis. Stat. (1937) § 102.23, which confines
reviews to the Circuit Court of Dane County.
54. Only the clearest language in the state statutes should compel this
holding. Some states do provide that the specified method and the named
court constitute the sole method of review. See note 36, supra. Since the
legislatures in states are ordinarily concerned merely with the jurisdiction
and venue of their own courts, there is no presumption that they intended
to e:xclude the federal courts from this subject matter; such statutes should
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accident board's award is confined to a suit brought "in the
county where the injury occurred,"' ' 5 and it has been argued that
federal review was confined to injuries occurring only in coun-
ties containing the twenty-five division points of the four dis-
tricts constituting the Texas federal courts,51 but this view has
previously been rejected.5 7 These venue restrictions are consid-
be liberally construed in favor of the exercise of federal jurisdiction in order
not to be held unconstitutional. 54 C. J. 209, 45 Am. Jur. 814. Where a mere
transitory right of action is created, state venue statutes should have no
force in federal courts. Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co. v. George, 233
U. S. 354, 34 S. Ct. 587, 58 L. Ed. 997 (1913); Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. v. Sowers,
213 U. S. 55, 29 S.Ct. 397, 53 L.Ed. 695 (1909).
Because they are sui generis, a peculiar rule of law applies to suits in
the United States District Courts against the state or its officials for the
recovery of state taxes paid-under protest under a state statute which would
unquestionably allow the proceedings in a state court. Great Northern Life
Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 64 S. Ct. 873, 88 L. Ed. 1121 (1944); Ford Motor
Co. v. Department of Treasury, Indiana, 323 U. S. 459, 65 S. Ct. 347, 89 L.
Ed. 389 (1945). In these tax cases, the usual "suspense statute," by naming
the state court in which recovery may be sought, eliminates the question of
consent of the state to be sued in the federal court under the Eleventh Amend-
ment. Even though no state court is named in the statute, strict construc-
tion against implied consent of the state to be sued in the federal courts pro-
duces the same result, but in workmen's compensation cases (save in in-
stances where state funds are involved, and where state boards are actually
parties litigant), where the state is hot a party this language in the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the Read case, supra, must be the
law whether or not the state has named one of its own courts as a reviewing
body of workmen's compensation awards: "In the past, even when the juris-
dictional grant has been couched in language giving substantial ground for
the argument of restriction to the state court, this Court has not found
denial by a State of the right to go to a federal court within that State when
it in fact opened the doors of its own courts." 322 U. S. 47, 62, 64 S. Ct.
873, 880, 88 L. Ed. 1121, 1130.
55. Tex. Ann. Rev. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1925) art. 8307a.
56. Associated Industrial Ins. Co. v. Ellis et al., 16 F. (2d) 464 (N. D.
Tex. 1926), affirmed 24 F. (2d) 809 (C. C. A. 5th, 1928), cert. denied 278 U. S.
649, 49 S. Ct. 92, 73 L. Ed. 561 (1928).
57. Ibid. Questions have arisen frequently in Texas concerning quashing
of service on defendant insurance carriers not to be found in the county,
division, or district wherein the injury occurred. Adair v. Employers' Rein-
surance Corp., 10 F. Supp. 725 (N. D. Tex., 1935); New York Indemnity Co.
v. Rasmusson, 1 F. Supp. 156 (S. D. Tex. 1932). And transfers have been
made from one division to another division embracing the county in which
the injury occurred. Birdwell v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 48 F. Supp. 950 (S. D.
Tex. 1943); Castellano v. Indemnity Co. of North America, 52 F. Supp. 941
(S. D. Tex. 1943); Hawthorne v. Anchor Casualty Co., 53 F. Supp. 475 (S. D.
Tex. 1943). But see Kibler v. Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc., 63 F.
Supp. 724 (E. D. N. Y. 1945), commenting on the lack of express authority
and lack of administrative machinery to transfer a case from one district
to another district.
A motion to dismiss on the ground that venue was improperly laid has
been sustained in a suit in Texas on a Louisiana injury and arising under
the laws of Louisiana, where neither plaintiff nor defendant resided in the
federal district where suit was brought. Knobloch v. M. W. Kellogg Co., 58
F. Supp. 743 (S. D. Tex. 1944).
But where defendant is a foreign corporation, with a resident agent for
service, venue may be governed by the rule announced in Mississippi Pub-
lishing Co. v. Murphree, 326 U. S. 438, 66 S. Ct. 242, 90 L. Ed. 207 (1946).
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ered by the Texas decisions to be jurisdictional in their nature. 8
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Burford v. Sun Oil Con-
pany,"5 a little doubt is now cast upon such decisions as Ellis v.
Associated Industries Insurance Corporation." An absurd result
would be reached admittedly if suits to set aside the award of the
Industrial Accident Commission could be brought in counties
constituting the twenty-five division points of the federal courts
and in which injuries occurred, whereas such suits to set aside
the commission's award could not be brought in the federal
courts where injuries occurred in the remaining two hundred
twenty-nine counties in the State of Texas.-
The form and incidences of the proceedings are determined
by the state constitution and laws. Where decisions of boards or
commissions are involved and no constitutional question is raised,
federal district courts will not assume jurisdiction of workmen's
compensation claims unless their powers to hear and try these
issues are clearly found in or inferred from the state statutes,
but the opinion is here expressed that the mere naming of a
state court of review or appeal in the statute creating workmen's
compensation, without more, does not evidence an intention on
the part of the state legislature to confine review to state courts
alone 2 ' Given, of course, this form and incidences, the deter-
58. Oilmen's Reciprocal Assn. v. Franklin, 116 Tex. 59, 286 S. W. 195
(1926). Provision is now made [Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1925) art.
8307a] for a transfer of a case to the proper court of the county in which
the injury occurred.
59. See note 2, supra.
60. Associated Industrial Ins. Co. v. Ellis et al., 16 F. (2d) 464 (N. D.
Tex. 1926), affirmed 24 F. (2d) 809 (C. C. A. 5th, 1928), cert. denied 278 U. S.
649, 49 S. Ct. 92,73 L. Ed. 561 (1928), which held: "The provision [of the
Texas statute] that suit shall be brought in the county where injury oc-
curred is not infringed by bringing suit in the [federal] District Court
which includes the county within its territorial jurisdicton." 24 F. (2d)
809, 810.
61. Snce Burford v. Sun Oil Company was decided actually hundreds of
workmen's compensation cases have been filed in, removed to and tried in
the federal courts without objection. Many of these cases involved injuries
occurring in these remaining two hundred twenty-nine counties in the State
of Texas. The judiciary and practitioners are practically unanimous in
their opinion that in Texas all workmen's compensation cases are triable
in the federal courts, regardless of the particular county in which the injury
occurred, assuming diversity and proper amount.
62. In the following states, review is provided in these named courts of
original jurisdiction: Alabama, Circuit Court [Ala. Code (Michie, 1941) Tit.
26, § 304]; Arkansas Circuit Court [Ark. Dig. Stat. (Pope, supp. 1944) § 25,
p. 1385]; Colorado, District Court [Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1935) c. 97, § 3281;
Connecticut, Superior Court [Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930) § 5252]; Delaware, Su-
perior Court [Del. Rev. Code (1935) § 18, c. 175]; Florida, Circuit Court [Fla.
Stat. Ann. (1943) tit. 15, § 440.27-1'; Georgia, Superior Court [Ga. Code Ann.
(Park, et al., 1937) § 114-710]; Hawaii, Circuit Court [Hawaii Rev. Laws
(1935) § 7518]; Illinois, Circuit Court [Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c.
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mination of whether it is a judicial proceeding (a "case of con-
troversy") will be decided by the application of federal standards
and doctrines.6 3 This method of jurisdictional determination is
not actually inconsistent with the general proposition that state
legislatures may not enlarge or limit the jurisdiction of federal
courts nor define the venue of federal courts. 4
By analogy to recent federal cases,u the absence of a speci-
fied review of the awards of a state administrative agency may
not imply an extra-statutory right of review;'06 but, rather in the
absence of any method of review,- there may be a presumption
that the legislature intended to withhold any review depending
on the legislative or judicial history of the enactment.68 These
cases just mentioned were the outgrowth of acts by the National
48, § 156(e) (1)]; Indiana, Circuit or Superior Court [Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns,
1933) § 40-1513]; Iowa, District Court [Iowa Code (1935) § 1449]; Kansas,
District Court [Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, 1935) § 44-556]; Kentucky,
Circuit Court [Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Baldwin, 1943) § 342.285]; Maine, Su-
perior Court [Me. Rev. Stat. (1930) c. 55, § 40]; Massachusetts, Superior Court
[Mass. Ann. Laws (1942) c. 152, § 11]; Michigan, Circuit Court [Mich. Comp.
Laws (1929) c. 150, § 8452]; Missouri, Circuit Court [Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann.
(1939) c. 29, § 3732]; Montana, District Court [Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. (An-
derson & McFarland, 1935) § 2959]; Nebraska, District Court [Neb. Rev.
Stat. (1943) § 48-181]; New Hampshire, Superior Court [N. 1-1. Pub. Laws
(1926) c. 178, § 26; New Jersey, Court of Common Pleas [N. J. Rev. Stat.
(1937) tit. 34, § 15-66]; North Carolina, Superior Court [N. C. Code Ann.
(Michie, 1935) § 8081(000)]; North Dakota, District Ct. [N.D. Comp. Laws.
Ann. (Supp. 1925) § 396 a 17]; Ohio Court of Common Pleas [Ohio Gen.
Code Ann. (Page, 1937) § 1346.4]; Oregon, Circuit Court [Ore. Code Ann.
(1930) § 49-1843]; Pennsylvania, Court of Common Pleas [Pa. Stat. Ann.
(Purdon, 1930) tit. 77, § 853]; South Carolina, Court of Common Pleas [S.C.
Code § 7035-63]; South Dakota, Circuit Court (S. D. Comp. Laws (1929) §
64.07]; Tennessee, Circuit Court (Tenn. Code Ann. (Michie, 1934) § 6885];
Vermont, County Court [Vt. Pub. Laws (1933) § 6548]; Washington, Su-
perior Court [Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1932) § 7697.
In these states, unusual provisions for review are found: Arizona Supe-
rior Court and Supreme Court [Ariz. Rev. Code Ann. (Bobbs Merrill, 1939)
H9 56-914, 56-972]; Maryland, Circuit Court of Common Law Courts of Balti-
more City [Md. Ann. Code (Flack, 1939), art. 101, § 70]; Rhode Island, Su-
perior Court for Counties of Bristol and Providence [R. I. Gen. Laws (1938)
c. 300, art. 3, § 4]; Texas, "In the county where the injury occurred [Tex.
Ann. Rev. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1925) art. 8307(5)(1)]; Wisconsin, Circuit Court
for Dane County [Wis. Stat. (1939) § 102.23].
63. Road Dist. v. St. Louis S. W. Ry., 257 U. S. 547, 42 S. Ct. 250, 66 L.
Ed. 364 (1922).
64. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315, 63 S. Ct. 1098, 87 L. Ed. 1424
(1943). Just as state statutes do not directly create, enlarge or lessen the
federal court's jurisdiction, so also should not the state statute directly cre-
ate, enlarge or lessen the venue of the action in the federal court. Hughes,
Federal Practice, Jurisdiction and Procedure (1931) § 2082. The rule in
Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938) is not
applicable. Comity as such is not involved.
65. See cases cited in note 51, supra.
66. See note 42, supra.
67. See cases cited in note 51, supra.
68. Ibid.
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Mediation Board.es Since the membership of some workmen's
compensation boards is made up of representatives of employees,
employers and the public,10 it may well be contended that this
award is in fact the result of mediation, arbitration and concilia-
tion 71-under this contention no right of review would be pre-
sumed or inferred in the absence of express legislative grant.
As a helpful background in answering Mr. Justice Frank-
furter's question, in examining state workmen's compensation
laws, the following determinations should be made:
1. The make-up of the board, whether or not it is a quasi-
court and wl~ether or not its members are designated as rep-
resentatives of industry, labor and the public.
2. The nature of the review provided, whether or not it
exists at all, whether or not it is partial, de novo, or is appel-
late in its nature.
3. The jurisdiction and venue conferred on the appellate
or reviewing court.
4. Whether or not supervision or a working partnership
relationship exists over and between the reviewing court and
the board itself.
5. When the cause becomes justiciable and, therefore,
ren' ao able.
6. Whether or not the board has expressly granted rule-
making power, whether or not rule-making power is inherent
or implied in the board, and whether or not this rule-making
power has been exercised or attempted to be exerised.
7. Whether or not any board or commission is provided
to pass upon the claims.
8. A conclusion generally as to whether or not the right
given by the state statute and the remedy of review are so
interwoven as to restrict review to state courts alone.
69. Ibid.
70. Idaho [Idaho Code Ann. (1932) § 43-1301]; Illinois [Ill. Rev. Stat.
Ann. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 48, § 150]; North Dakota [N. D. Comp. Laws
Ann. (Supp. 1925) § 396a4J; Ohio [Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1946) §
871.51; South Carolina [S. C. Code (1942) § 7035-54]; Virginia [Va. Code
(1942) § 1887.52].
71. See cases cited in note 51, supra.
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The mere absence of statutory review would not preclude
consideration of constitutional issues.7 2
IV. THE WORIvIEN'S COMPENSATION CASE IN THE FEDERAL COURT
Only when the proceedings are judicial in nature and only
when the original federal jurisdiction is invoked, workmen's
compensation cases reach nisi prius federal courts either upon
removal from state courts,73 or upon being filed there originally
to dispose of the entire controversy,74 or through declaratory
judgment proceedings to settle isolated issues.
There is an utter lack of uniformity in the so-called "ap-
peals" from the orders of certain workmen's compensation
boards.', In some instances the trial at nisi prius stage being
wholly de novo; 71 in other instances being confined to purely
questions of law;7 7 in other instances confined to questions of law
and fact; 7 in other instances the findings of the board, in the
72. See Switchmen's Union of North America v. National Mediation
Board, 320 U. S. 297, 64 S. Ct. 95, 88 L. Ed. 61 (1943).
73. 28 U. S. C. A. § 71 (1927). Suits may be removed from courts of
Porto Rico, 48 U. S. C. A. § 864 (1928), and from the courts of the territory
of Hawaii, 48 U. S. C. A. § 645, under the same terms and conditions as re-
movals from state courts to federal courts. The territorial courts of Alaska,
48 U. S. C. A. § 101, are combination federal and territorial courts. Ordinarily,
the laws ,of the Philippine Islands and the decrees of its courts, 48 U. S. C. A.
§§ 1003, 1071, are ,not subject to review by our federal courts, 28 U. S. C. A.
§§ 349, 349a. But cases under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U. S.
C. A. § 51 et seq., dealing with railroad carriers, which are filed originally
in the state courts, are not removable. 45 U. S. C. A. § 56.
74. 28 U. S. C. A. § 41.
75. See note 21, supra.
76. See notes 21, 22 and 23, supra.
77. Arkansas [Ark. Dig. Stat. (Pope, Supp. 1944) p. 1385]; District of
Columbia [D. C. Code (1940) tit. 36, § 501]; 33 U. S. C. A. § 921 (1928)]; Indiana
[Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 40-1512]; Maine [Me. Rev. Stat. (1930) c.
55, § 40]; Michigan [Mich. Comp. Laws (1929) § 8451]; New York [N. Y.
Workmen's Compensation Law (1946) § 231; North Carolina [N. C. Code
Ann. (Michie, 1935) § 8081 (ppp)]; Oklahoma [Okla. Stat. Ann. (1938) tit.
85, § 26]; Pennsylvania [Purdon's Stat. Ann. (1939) tit. 77, § 855]; Puerto
Rico [P. R. Workmen's Accident Compensation Act, § 61; Utah [Utah Rev.
Stat. Ann. (1933) § 42-1-791; Virginia [Va. Code Ann. (1936) § 1887(47)];
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers, 33 U. S. C. A. § 921 (1928).
78. Connecticut [Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930) § 52C21; Delaware [Del. Rev.
Code (1935) § 60881; West Virginia [W. Va. Code Ann. (Michie & Sublett,
1932) § 2545(3)1.
Review in Arizona is by certiorari [Ariz. Rev. Code Ann. (Struckmeyer,
1928) § 1452]: "If necessary the court may review the evidence." Ibid.
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absence of fraud, are conclusive; 9 in other instances the review-
ing court passes on only the evidence as contained in the record
brought up from the board;80 and in other instances confined to
specified grounds of review.8 1 Other differences arise out of the
fact that in some states a designated court investigates facts as a
sort of quasi-board, 2 in other states a compensation court is set
up,83 in other states an independent workmen's compensation
appeal board is provided,84 in other states review is discretionary
with the court,8 5 and in still others arbitration of claims is pro-
vided at some stage of the proceedings. 6 The question is not com-
plicated, however, by whether or not the workmen's compensa-
tion insurance carrier is a self-insurer ,or an insurance company
writing a policy of workmen's compensation insurance. The
79. Georgia [Ga. Code Ann. (Park, et al., 1936) tit. 114, § 710]; Indiana
[Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 40-1512]; Iowa [Iowa Code (1935) § 14521;
Kentucky [Ky. Stat. Ann. (Carroll, 1936) § 4092; Maine [Me. Rev. Stat.
(1930) c. 55, § 40]; Michigan [Mich. Comp. Laws (1929) § 8451]; Missouri [Mo.
Rev. Stat. Ann. (1939) § 3732]; Oklahoma [Okla. Stat. Ann. (1938) tit. 85, §
26]; South Carolina [S. C. Code (1942) § 7035-54]; Virginia [Va. Code (1942)
§ 1887.61]; Wisconsin [Wis. Stat. (1939) § 102.23].
80. Arkansas [Ark. Dig. Stat. (Pope, Supp. 1944) p. 1385, § 25); Colorado
[Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1935) c. 97, § 328]; Delaware [Del. Rev. Code (1935)
c. 175, § 18]; Florida [Fla. Stat. Ann. (1944) § 440.27]; Idaho [Idaho Code
Ann. (1932) § 43-1409]; Illinois [Ill. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) §
40-15121; Iowa [Iowa Code (1935) § 1453]; Kansas [Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Cor-
rick, 1935) § 44-556]; Kentucky [Ky. Stat. Ann. (Carroll, 1936) § 4092]; Min-
nesota [Minn. Stat. (Mason, Supp. 1936) § 4320]; Missouri [Mo. Code Ann.(1939) § 37321; Nebraska [Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943) § 48-178]; New Jersey [N.J.
Rev. Stat. (1937) tit. 34, § 15-27]; Ohio [Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1937)§ 1465-90]; Pennsylvania [Pa. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1946) tit. 77, § 872]; South
Carolina [S. C. Workmen's Compensation Act, § 60]; South Dakota [S. D.
Comp. Laws (1929) § 64.0707]; Utah [Utah Workmen's Compensation Act,
§ 42-1-78]; Washington [Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1933) § 76971;
Wisconsin [Wis. Workmen's Compensation Act, § 102.23].
81. Review is frequently confined to these grounds:
"1. That the commission acted without or in excess of its powers.
"2. That the award was procured by fraud.
"3. That the facts found by the commission do not support the award.
"4. That there was not sufficient competent evidence in the record to
warrant the making of the award."
Arkansas [Ark. Workmen's Compensation Act, § 25]; California [Calif.
Civ. Code (Deering, 1937) § 5952]; Colorado [Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1935)
c. 97, § 382]; Georgia [Ga. Code Ann. (Park, et al., 1936) tit. 114, § 710];
Idaho [Idaho Code Ann. (1932) § 43-1409); Iowa [Iowa Code (1935) § 1453];
Kentucky [Ky. Stat. Ann. (Carroll, 1936), § 342.285; Maryland [Md. Work-
men's Compensation Law, § 561; Minnesota [Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927) §
4320]; Missouri [Mo. Stat. Ann. (1942) p. 739, § 3732]; Nebraska [Neb. Comp.
Stat. (1-939) § 48-174]; Utah [Utah Rev. Stat. Ann. (1933) § 42-1-78]; Wiscon-
sin [Wis. Workmen's Compensation Act, § 102.231.
82. Tennessee [Tenn. Code Ann. (Michie, 1938) § 6885]; Wyoming [Wyo.
Rev. Stat. (1931) § 124-113].
83. Nebraska [Neb. Comp. Stat. (1939) § 48-163].
84. West Virginia [W. Va. Code Ann. (Michie & Sublett, 1937) §
2545(1)].
85. Id. at §2545(3).
86. 71 C. J. 955, 1043-1048.
1947] COMPENSATION CASES IN FEDERAL COURTS 367
opinion is expressed that federal courts will not take jurisdiction
in any of these instances save and except where the trial is
wholly de novo.8 7
It is elementary that a workmen's compensation claim would
not be removable before it was filed. Since many workmen's
compensation boards possess the framework and powers of quasi
courts, it may be argued that the claim becomes removable upon
being filed with such a board, but there is no indication that the
courts will so hold.8 Many appeals from the workmen's compen-
sation boards are to state intermediate appellate courts or to
state civil courts of last resort.90 The cause does not become re-
movable to the federal courts after being filed in such an appel-
late court because such an action could not have been filed in
the federal courts in the first instance.9 '
With the question of removability in mind, many states
have sought to circumvent the taking of the claim to the federal
courts by statutes or legal fiction; but while the states have a
right to deny permits to do business to foreign corporations and
may require foreign corporations to reincorporate as domestic
87. Many states allow the employer to qualify as a self-insurer by filing
evidence of its solvency.
Some states have optional state insurance carriers or compulsory and
exclusive state funds into which employers pay premiums.
The state boards, or commissions, claimants, employers, insurance car-
riers, re-insurers and receivers variously have and have not been held to be
"parties," "interested parties," "aggrieved parties," or "affected by" orders,
boards, or commissions in particular states awarding or refusing compensa-
tion and as such entitled to appeal to the courts. 71 C. J. 1228.
88. For instance, in Oklahoma the* State Industrial Commission is said
to be a "tribunal of limited jurisdiction," Wilson Drilling Co. v. Beyer, 138
Okla. 248, 280 Pac. 246 (1929) and" 'administrative tribunal' with limited juris-
diction," Spaulding & Osborne v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 192 Okla. 154,
134 P.(2d) 581, 192 Okla. 157, 134 P.(2d) 587 (1943); is "not a 'court' but is an
administrative body clothed with quasi judicial powers," Sartin v. Moran-
Buckner Co., 189 Okla. 178, 114 P. (2d) 938 (1941).
89. California, District Court of Appeal, or to supreme court [Calif.
Civ. Code (Deering, 1937) § 5950]; New York, Appellate Division of Supreme
Court [N. Y. Consol. Laws of 1914, c. 67, § 23].
90. Arizona, Superior Court and Supreme Court [Ariz. Rev. Code Ann.
(1939) §§ 56-914, 56-9721; California, District Court of Appeal, or to Supreme
Court [Calif. Civ. Code (Deering, 1937) § 5950]; Idaho, Supreme Court [Idaho
Code Ann. (1932) § 43-14091; Minnesota, Supreme Court [Minn. Stat. (Mason,
1927) § 4320]; Oklahoma, Supreme Court [Okla. Stat. Ann. (1136) tit. 85,
§ 29]; Puerto Rico, Supreme Court [P. R. Workmen's Compensation Act, §
11]; Utah, Supreme Court [Utah Workmen's Compensation Act, § 42-1-77];
Virginia, Supreme Court of Appeals [Va. Workmen's Compensation Laws,
§ 61]; West Virginia, Supreme Court of Appeal [W. Va. Code Ann. (Michie
& Sublett, 1937) § 2545(3)]; Wyoming, Supreme Court IWyo. Rev. Stat.
(1931) § 124-113].
91. 45 Am. Jur. 823, 54 C. J. 213.
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corporations in order to do an intrastate business,12 nevertheless,
it is settled that it may not be made a prerequisite to foreign cor-
porations doing business within the state to surrender their right
to remove their lawsuits to the federal courts. 3 Likewise, the
fiction that the corporation upon obtaining a permit to do busi-
ness in a state accepts the terms of the state workmen's compen-
sation law and ipso facto domesticates itself and surrenders its
right of removal is legally untenable. 4
A word of caution is given to situations where the federal
court remands the case after removal. There is no method by
which even obvious error in the remanding order can be re-
viewed. 5 The easiest way in which a test case can have the as-
surance of ultimate and complete disposition is for the state
court to refuse removal, for the point to be preserved only
through the state court of last resort and then brought up to the
United States Supreme Court by certiorari. 6 The point could be
preserved, of course, if the federal court refuses to remand.
The principles governing workmen's compensation cases filed
originally in federal court are identical with the principles gov-
erning the removability of workmen's compensation cases from
state courts to the federal courts, the only distinction being which
suit was filed first. 7 Attention is merely called, without com-
ment, to certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, injunction, proce-
92. 23 Am. Jur. 247, 394-396; 45 Am. Jur. 816.
93. 23 Am. Jur. 245 et seq., 394 et seq.; 45 Am. Jur. 815 et seq.
See Tex. Ann. Rev. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1935) art. 4687; Terral v. Burke
Construction Co., 257 U. S. 529, 42 S. Ct. 188, 66 L. Ed. 352 (1922). See Potts,
Cancellation of Foreign Corporation's Permit as Penalty for Removal to
Federal Courts (1923) 1 Texas L. Rev. 82. As to derial of access by foreign
corporation to state courts, see Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U. S.
202, 64 S. Ct. 967, 88 L. Ed. 1227 (1944).
94. But see holdings to the contrary in Bolin v. Swift Co., 335 Mo. 732,
73 S. W. (2d) 774 (1934); Elsas v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 38 F. (2d) 303
(D. C. Mo. 1929); McFall v. Barton-Mansfield Co., 338 Mo. 110, 61 S. W.
(2d) 911 (1933). These cases may be correctly decided as to result on the
grounds that any right of removal had been waived in trial participation
and that the wording of the Missouri statute precluded federal review by
combining the right and the remedy.
95. 28 U. S. C. A. § 71 (1927). In re Satterley, 102 F. (2d) 144 (C. C. A.
5th, 1939).
96. Metropolitan Casualty Co. v. Stevens, 312 U. S. 563, 61 S. Ct. 715, 85 L.
Ed. 1044 (1941).
97. Some workmen's compensation cases are triable only in federal
courts. The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33
U. S. C. A. § 901 et seq. (1927), which is by statute made the Employee's
Compensation Act of the District of Columbia, 45 Stat. 600 [D. C. Code
(1929) tit. 19, §§ 11, 121. If any judicial review is allowed of the awards,
United States Employee's Compensation Commission, 5 U. S. C. A. §§ 751
et seq., 787, it would have to be filed originally in the federal courts.
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dendo and quo warranto proceedings which have been instituted
in federal courts against similar state boards or their officials.
Federal courts, under their so-called "denial of the enjoyment
of the fruits" doctrine," may entertain suits alleging fraud in
the entry of judgments in state courts or in the decrees of state
boards which have the finality and effect of court judgments."
Attention is again called to suits which may be filed in federal
courts on workmen's compensation acts which set up no board
or commission machinery and which do not otherwise confine
the suit to any particular state court. 00
In advance of administrative hearings, however, suits in the
nature of declaratory judgment proceedings have never met with
favor insofar as they concern workmen's compensation ques-
tions, especially where state boards have been set up and state
statutory proceedings prescribed.' 0 ' The courts either hold that
the courts had no jurisdiction of declaratory judgment proceed-
ings"0 2 or hold that since an administrative remedy has been
prescribed, it must be first exhausted. 13 The federal courts will
undoubtedly follow the rule announced by the state decisions.
Frequently a jury is not available at any stage of the pro-
ceeding beginning with the hearing before the state administra-
tive agency and ending with the review provided under the state
statute."0 This is further reason why federal nisi prius courts
either would hold they had no jurisdiction or would refuse to
exercise their jurisdiction.0 ' Where the review of the adminis-
trative boards is in fact appellate in its nature, the difficulty which
appellate courts have always encountered in trying issues of fact
98. Moffett v. Robbins, 81 F. (2d) 431 (C. C. A. 10th, 1936), cert. denied
298 U. S. 675, 56 S. Ct. 939, 80 L. Ed. 1396 (1936).
99. Gravitt v. Shell Oil Co., Inc., 36 F. Supp. 841 (D. C. Okla., 1941). In
these equity suits to set aside awards or compromise and settlement agree-
ments on the grounds of fraud, accident or mistake, the better practice is for
federal courts to abstain from taking jurisdiction, however. See generally,
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Kelly, 87 F. (2d) 46 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936).
100. See note 29, supra.
101. Anderson, Declaratory Judgments (1940) 69, 144, 642; Borchard,
Declaratory Judgments (1934) 248, 342.
102. Anderson, loc. cit. supra note 101.
103. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41, 50, 51, 58 S.
Ct. 459, 463, 82 L. Ed. 638, 643 (1938); Borchard, op. cit. supra note 101, at 65,
237, 343, 878, 914; 42 Am. Jur. 580.
104. See, for example, Tennessee [Tenn. Code Ann. (Michie, 1938) § 6885].
See Note (1921) 35 Harv. L. Rev. 761.
See Stumberg, Finality of Administrative Process under the Longshore-
men's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (1932) 10 Texas L. Rev. 438.
105. 42 Am. Jur. 486. But see McLaughlin v. Western Union, 7 F. (2d)
177 (D. C. La. 1925).
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presents another reason why federal courts would refuse to take
jurisdiction.1 "
V. EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND CONFLICT OF LAWS
Assuming that the federal courts of original jurisdiction may
try workmen's compensation cases, and assuming that the cause
of action is transitory in its nature, based on a statute having
extraterritorial effect, then federal courts even in another state
may try the question just as well as the state in which the injury
occurred or in which the claimant resides.10 Federal courts have
106. 3 Am. Jur. 435, 5 C. J. S. 549.
107. United Dredging Co. v. Lindberg, 18 F. (2d) 453 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937),
cert. denied 274 U. S. 759, 47 S. Ct. 769, 71 L. Ed. 1337 (1927); Esteves v.
Lykes Bros. S. S. Co., Inc., 74 F.r (2d) 364 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934); Stepp v.
Employers' Liability Assur. Corp., Ltd., 30 F. Supp. 558 (D. C. Tex. 1939);
Franzen v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 146 F. (2d) 837 (C. C. A.
3rd, 1944). But not in advance, at least of the Industrial Accident Board
passing on the claim-Elliott v. De Soto Crude Oil Purchasing Corp., 20 F.
Supp. 743 (D. C. La. 1937).
Assuming that the federal court may finally dispose of the instant case,
many questions have arisen as to whether or not state courts are bound by
law points previously decided by the intermediate federal courts, see anno-
tation in 147 A. L. R. 857 (1943). While these federal decisions are unques-
tionably persuasive, as a practical matter their effect is weakened if they
are decided by an intermediate federal court outside of the state, or outside
of the circuit in which the state is located.
Suits involving the Louisiana Employers' Liability Act have twice been
dismissed by Texas state courts: Johnson v. Employers Liability Assur.
Corp., Ltd., 99 S. W. (2d) 979 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936), writ of error refused by
Supreme Court of Texas; Federal Underwriters Exchange v. Doyle, 110 S. W.
(2d) 618 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937), on the ground that the public policy of Texas
required the courts of Texas to refuse to assume jurisdiction because of the
dissimilarity between the substantive and procedural laws of Louisiana and
Texas. Notwithstanding the doctrine of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U. S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938), however, United States District
Courts have in similar cases asserted their right to independently formulate
their own policy and determine their own jurisdiction, Stepp v. Employers'
Liability Assur. Corp., Ltd., 30 F. Supp. 558 (D. C. Tex. 1939); Franzen v.
E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 36 F. Supp. 375 (D. C. N. J. 1941). See an-
notation in 132 A. L. R. 470 (1941), 100 A. L. R. 950 (1936), "Duty of Federal
Courts to follow state statutes or decisions of state Courts as regard ques-
tions of public policy as to recognition or enforcement of rights or obliga-
tions arising in another state, or other questions as to conflict of laws."
A workmen's compensation case tried in the federal court should give
the same full faith and credit and should be given the same full faith and
credit as a case tried In the state court, or decided by a board, Art. IV,
§ 1, of the Constitution, 28 U. S. C. A. § 687 (1928); Magnolia Petroleum Co.
v. Hunt, 320 U. S. 430, 64 S. Ct. 208, 88 L. Ed. 149 (1943).
The Pennsylvania state workmen's compensation act has been held
applicable to the employees of a private contractor engaged in work at the
Philadelphia Navy Yard; this Yard had been ceded to the United States in
1868, Capetola v. Barclay White Co., 139 F. (2d) 556 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1943). Com-
pare Western Union Telegraph Company v. Chiles, 214 U. S. 27-., 29 S. Ct.
613, 53 L. Ed. 994 (1909).
But see Logan v. Missouri Valley Bridge & Iron Co., 157 Ark. 528, 249
S. W. 21 (1923), holding that Oklahoma's workmen's compensation act, be-
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already had to choose between the laws of the state where the
contract of employment was made, where the injury occurred
and where the suit was brought.105 Depending upon whether or
not they may exercise original jurisdiction, in many states the
federal district courts may have to resolve conflict of workmen's
compensation laws, as would the Supreme Court of the United
States on a case brought up to it by certiorari from the highest
state court. Naturally, preliminary awards of state boards would
in most instances be involved. So, in admiralty cases and those
cases involving the Federal Employers' Liability Acts, Section
401 (c) of the Restatement of the Law; Conflict of Laws pro-
vides:
"c. Effect of Federal Employers' Liability Act or admiralty
jurisdiction. If the case is one which is within the scope of a
Federal Employers' Liability Act, 0 or of admiralty jurisdic-
tion,"' the remedy under a State Workmen's Compensation
Act cannot be constitutionally allowed in any State of the
United States. If the case comes under the federal Act even
though the act provides no remedy under the circumstances,
there can be no remedy under a Workmen's Compensation
Act."
VI. RULE-MAKING POWER OF COMMISSIONS As AFFECTING
JURISDICTION OF FEDERAL COURT
Workmen's compensation commissions frequently have rule-
making power expressly granted them by the legislature.' In
cause of its peculiar terms, is not enforceable in Arkansas. On the Oklahoma
act, see also Compton v. Carter Oil Co., 283 Fed. 22 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922).
But if the action given is transitory, mere state venue provisions can
have no extraterritorial effect. See Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co. v.
George, 233 U. S. 354, 34 S. Ct. 587, 58 L. Ed. 997 (1913); Atchison T. & S. F.
Ry., v. Sowers, 213 U. S. 55, 29 S. Ct. 397, 53 L. Ed. 695 (1909).
108. McCaffery v. American Mutual Liability Ins. Co., 32 F. (2d) 791
(D. C. Tex. 1929), alffirmed 37 F. (2d) 870 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930); Bradford
Electric Light Co., Inc. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145, 52 S. Ct. 571, 76 L. Ed.
1026 (1932); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Commission of
California, 294 U. S. 532, 55 S. Ct. 518, 79 L. Ed. 1044 (1935); Magnolia Pe-
troleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U. S. 430, 64 S. Ct. 208, 88 L. Ed. 149 (1943); Betts
v. Southern Ry. Co., 71 F. (2d) 787 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934).
109. New York Central Railroad Co. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 147, 37 S. Ct.
546, 61 L. Ed. 1045 (1917).
110. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 37 S. Ct. 524, 61 L. Ed.
1086 (1917); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149, 40 S. Ct. 438,
64 L. Ed. 834 (1920); State of Washington v. W. C. Dawson & Co., 264 U. S.
219, 44 S. .Ct. 302, 68 L. Ed. 646 (1924); Nogueira v. New York, New Haven
& Hartford Railroad Co., 281 U. S. 128, 50 S. Ct. 303, 74 L. Ed. 754 (1930).
The whole field of conflict of laws in workmen's compensation cases is
covered in the Restatement of the Law; Conflict of Laws §§ 398-403.
111. Arkansas [Ark. Dig. Stat. (Pope, Supp. 1944) p. 1360]; California
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the absence of such a grant, the rule-making power may be im-
plied or inherent in their functioning.'"2 While this power may
not of itself enlarge the jurisdiction of the commission, never-
theless it could have a material bearing upon the effect of the
board's award and consequently whether or not the matter be-
came justiciable in the federal courts, especially if such rules, by
their notoriety, by their involving material questions, by legisla-
tive long acquiescence in them without questoning them in any
manner, acquired what is tantamount to legislative sanction.11
As yet no case has been found in which administrative rules af-
fected the jurisdiction of courts or judicial review; but as these
boards and commissions become rule-conscious the opinion is
expressed that sooner or later admnistrative interpretation as
evidenced by rule-making may be determinative of even a federal
jurisdictional question.
VII. DOcTRINE OF ABSTENTION
This topic has received some attention under Section II,
supra; nevertheless it is of such current importance as to neces-
sitate separate treatment. The federal courts have "refrained
from an unnecessary decision"; '" "declined to exercise their jur-
[Calif. Gen. Laws (Deering, 1931) act 4749, § 57]; Colorado [Colo. Stat. Ann.
(Michie, 1935) c. 97, § 41]; Connecticut [Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930) § 5243];
Delaware [Del. Rev. Code (1935) c. 175, § 23]; Florida [Fla. Stat. Ann. (1943)
§§ 440.25, 440.33]; Georgia [Ga. Code Ann. (Park, et al., 1936) § 114-7031;
Idaho [Idaho Code Ann. (1932) § 43-1413]; Illinois [Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-
Hurd, 1934) c. 48, § 153]; Indiana [Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 40-1506];
Iowa [Iowa Code (1939) § 1431]; Kentucky [Ky. Rev. Stat. (Carroll, 1942)
§ 342.260]; Maine [Me. Rev. Stat. (1930) c. 55, § 29]; Maryland [Md. Ann.
Code (Flack, 1939) art. 101, § 9]; Massachusetts [Mass. Ann. Laws (1942)
c. 152, § 5]; Michigan [Mich. Comp. Laws (1929) c. 150, § 8442]; Minnesota
[Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927) § 3615]; Missouri [Mo. Rev. Stat. (1939) § 3751];
Nebraska [Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943) § 48-163]; Nevada [Nev. Comp. Laws
(Hillyer, 1929) § 2693]; New Jersey [N. J. Stat. Ann. (1940) tit. 34, § 15-641;
New York [N. Y. Consolidated Laws of 1914, c. 67, § 117]; North Carolina
[N. C. Code Ann. (Michie, 1935) § 8081(iii)]; North Dakota [N. D. Sess.
Laws (1919) c. 162, § 4]; Ohio [Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1937) § 871-22];
Oklahoma [Okla. Stat. Ann. (1936) tit. 85, § 77]; Oregon [Ore. Comp. Laws
(1930) § 102-1710]; Pennsylvania [Pa. Stat. (Purdon, Supp. 194,) tit. 77,
§ 112]; South Carolina [S. C. Code (1942) § 7035-57]; Texas [Tcx. Ann. Rev.
Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1925) art. 8307(4)]; Utah [Utah Code Ann. (1943) §
42-1-10]; Virginia [Va. Code Ann. (1942) § 1887(55)]; West Virginia [W. Va.
Code Ann. (Michie & Sublett, 1932) § 2506]; Wisconsin [Vis. Stat. (1939) §
102.15].
In Hawaii [Hawaii Rev. Laws (1935) § 7518], the courts may make
rules to prescribe appellate procedure.
112. 42 Am. Jur. 329, 421, 477 (1944).
113. Brooks v. Dewar, 313 U. S. 354, 61 S. Ct. 979, 85 L. Ed. 39 (1941).
114. Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U. S. 228, 61 S. Ct. 7, 8S L. Ed.
9 (1943).
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isdiction"; 115 and "exercised a sound discretion" 116 in laying down
their so-called "doctrine of abstention,'111 7 especially in cases
dealing with conflicting decisions and being equity cases involv-
ing state law." 8 This doctrine of abstention means merely that
usually in exceptional cases relating to the discretionary powers
of courts of equity involving state constitutional questions, in-
terpreting state statutes, deciding state policies, or resolving con-
flicts in cases on state law questions, the federal courts will with-
hold the exercise of their jurisdiction either by abating the suit
in the federal court until the question has been decided in the
state courts or by dismissing the suit in the federal court with
instructions to the parties to proceed in state tribunals. Work-
men's compensation cases in the federal courts do not always
involve merely the fact of the injury, the extent of the injury,
the duration of the injury, the employee's wage rate or lump
sum payments. Frequently federal and state constitutional ques-
tions or statutory interpretations must be decided and made by
the federal court, whether sitting as a reviewing body or in the
original instance. Ordinarily, in the absence of discriminaton,
a violation of a right created by a state does not raise a substantial
federal question.' 9 The case of Thompson, Trustee v. Magnolia
Petroleum Company,"' must be now regarded as having been
limited, if not wholly emasculated, by Meredith v. City of Winter
Haven.12 In the Thompson case the federal court refused to re-
solve conflicts between federal circuit courts of appeals and in-
volving only questions of state law, whereas in the City of Win-
ter Haven case the Supreme Court remanded for resolving con-
flicts in the decisions of the highest state court and involving
115. Ibid.
116. Beal v. Missouri Pacific R. R., 312 U. S. 45, 61 S. Ct. 418, 85 L. Ed.
577 (1941).
117. Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496, 61 S. Ct. 643,
85 L. Ed. 971 (1941), noted in (1941) 54 Harv. L. Rev. 1379; Burford v. Sun
Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315, 63 S. Ct. 1098, 87 L. Ed. 1424 (1943).
118. City of Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc., 316 U. S. 168, 173, 62 S.
Ct. 986, 988, 86 L. Ed. 1355, 1358 (1942); Railroad Commission v. Pullman
Co., 312 U. S. 496, 61 S. Ct. 643, 85 L. Ed. 971 (1941); Thompson, Trustee v.
Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U. S. 478, 60 S. Ct. 628, 84 L. Ed. 876 (1940);
United States ex rel. Horigan v. Heyward, 98 F. (2d) 433 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939);
Morin v. City of Stuart, 111 F. (2d) 773 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940); Cavanaugh v.
Looney, 248 U. S. 453, 39 S. Ct. 142, 63 L. Ed. 354 (1919); DiGiovanni v. Camden
Ins. Ass'n, 296 U. S. 64, 56 S. Ct. 1, 80 L. Ed. 47 (1935); Gilchrist v. Inter-
borough Rapid Transit Co., 279 U. S. 159, 49 S. Ct. 282, 73 L. Ed. 652 (1929);
Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U. S. 228, 64 S. Ct. 7, 88 L. Ed. 9 (1943),
noted in (1944) 54 Harv. L. Rev. 1379.
119. Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U. S. 1, 64 S. Ct. 397, 88 L. Ed. 497 (1943).
120. 309 U. S. 478, 60 S. Ct. 628, 84 L. Ed. 876 (1940).
121. 320 U. S. 228, 64 S. Ct. 7, 88 L. Ed. 9 (1943).
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only questions of state law. It is to be presumed that whatever
remains of this doctrine will extend to the acts of state boards
in their determination of workmen's compensation questions.
Res judicata 2 2 and stare decisis,' -2 as applicable to the decision
of administrative agencies, have already received attention of
eminent authors.
The doctrine of abstention developed in these equity suits
for injunction is likely to have little application to actions for
enforcement of state compensation laws, where, as in Texas, the
state remedy is judicial, not discretionary in character.
A growing tendency on the part of federal courts to decline
to review similar administrative determinations is noted. Such
courts are holding that they are intellectually unqualified,- 4 or
they are holding that federal courts are inexperienced in ques-
tions presented,' or they are holding that they will not decide
the questions presented on the grounds of imperfections in the
judicial machinery. 126 The Supreme Court recently has abstained
from considering a law case involving a first impression deter-
mination of the common law of the District of Columbia by dis-
missing a certified question of the Court of Appeals.' 27 In agree-
ing that this was a local procedural problem to be decided by
local law, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion, also
called attention to the increase in volume and the complexity of
business coming to the court, and the bearing of the increase
upon the proper discharge of its work. This abstention by the
Supreme Court from itself deciding local law and leaving the
matter to an inferior federal court is wholly different, however,
from the problem confronting a Federal District Court in decid-
ing whether it will assume jurisdiction or abstain from assuming
jurisdiction; the first instance involves a choice between federal
122. 42 Am. Jur. 519 (1944); Res Judicata in Administrative Law (1940)
49 Yale L. J. 1250; Schopflocher, Doctrine of Res Judicata in Administrative
Law (1942) Wis. L. Rev. 5-42, 198-235.
Comment (1941) 26 Wash. U. L. Q. 268; Volinn, Res Judicata, Binding
Effect of Prior Ruling on Commission (1942) 22 B. U. L. Rev. 100; Comment
(1942)\ 30 Geo. L. J. 758; Comment (1941) 4 Ga. B. J. 77; Note (1942) 9 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 324.
123. Stare Decisis in N. L, R. B. and S. E. C. (1939) 16 N. Y. U. L. Q. 618.
124. Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan and Nichols Oil Co., 311
U. S. 570, 61 S. Ct. 343, 85 L. Ed. 358 (1941).
125. Ibid.
126. Ibid.
127. Busby v. Electric Utilities Employees Union, 323 U. S. 72, 65 S. Ct.
142, 89 L. Ed. 7R (1944).
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courts while the second instance involves a decision whether or
not Federal District Courts will first act at all.
State and federal constitutional questions are often presented
in workmen's compensation matters regardless of whether or
not review is provided and regardless of whether or not review
is restricted to state courts. Orderly and uniform procedure
should require that both state and federal constitutional ques-
tions be litigated first in state courts. 128
VIII. CONCLUSION
In Texas the validity of an order of the Railroad Commission
of the type involved in the Burford case is triable by a "suit in
a court of competent jurisdiction in Travis County. ' 121
Of this statute, the majority said in the Burford case: "A
statute similar to that involved in the instant case, which per-
mits suit in any competent court of Travis County, Texas, has
been construed to be an expression by the State of willingness
to allow these proceedings to be brought in a federal court (cit-
ing the Reagan case). Since federal equity jurisdiction depends
on federal statutes, the Texas statutory provision has little mean-
ing as applied to such cases.' 13
Prior to the Burford case,' the Supreme Court had before it
the case of Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols
Oil Company,182 also a second case of Railroad Commission of
Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Company.2 3 In these two cases,
involving different orders of the Railroad Commission which in
Texas has the administration of oil proration and the granting of
drilling permits, plaintiff sought to enjoin certain proration or-
ders of this administrative body on the grounds that as to it they
were unreasonable, unfair and as such confiscatory of its property
under the Fourteenth Amendment. No diversity of citizenship
was involved, which the Supreme Court in the first case thought
of significance in its original opinion, but took the trouble to
128. Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan and Nichols Oil Co., 310
U. S. 573, 60 S. Ct. 1021, 84 L. Ed. 1368 (1940), as amended by 311 U. S. 614,
61 S. Ct. 343 (1940).
129. Tex. Ann. Rev. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1935) art. 6049c, § 8.
130. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315, 63 S. Ct. 1098, 87 L. Ed. 1424
(1943).
131. Ibid.
132. 310 U. S. 573, 60 S. Ct. 1021, 84 L. Ed. 1368 (1940), opinion amended
311 U. S. 614, 61 S. Ct. 343 (1940).
133. 31 U. S. 570, 6 S. Ct. 343, 85 L. Ed. 358 (1941).
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modify by a subsequent amendment. These injunctions were
denied and plaintiff relegated to any remedies it had (which
perforce must originate, at least) in state courts.
This was the situation when the Burford case" 4 presented
itself. In this case an order of the commizsion granting permits
for the drilling of wells was sought to be enjoined on the ground
that it denied Sun Oil Company and others due process of law.
Diversity of citizenship and a federal question were involved.
The Supreme Court split five to four in denying the injunction
and again told plaintiffs to look first to their remedies in the
state courts.
With diversity and a federal question, Mr. Justice Frank-
furter would have granted the injunction, as would have the
Circuit Court of Appeals." 'a It is this dissent, joined in by the
Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Roberts and Mr. Justice Reed, in which
the attention of the courts and practitioners is called to the query,
as voiced by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, of whether or not rights
under workmen's compensation laws must be first pursued and
exhausted in state boards and in state courts prior to seeking
relief at the hands of the Federal Courts-even though sufficient
amount, proper diversity and a federal question are involved,
regardless of whether or not legal or equitable principles are at
issue. The Reagan case was an equity case, as was the Burford
case. Certainly insofar as equity cases are concerned, state stat-
utes pertaining to review of administrative orders must now be
regarded as of no force in allowing or disallowing federal review
of such orders. But in strictly law cases, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
was too apprehensive; in the absence of a federal constitutional
question, the state statute is all-important and largely determines
federal review. In these cases the discretion of the chancellor
sitting in a federal court to stay his hand in the public interest
is peculiar to suits for injunction or other equitable interposition.
Suits to enforce ordinary rights arising under state workmen's
compensation laws have not been looked upon as interferences
with state administrative action at all.
The Ware case,136 alluded to by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, is
still the law. The Louisiana workmen's compensation laws in-
134. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315, 63 S. Ct. 1098, 87 L Ed. 1424
(1943).
135. 130 F. (2d) 10 (C. C. A. 5th, 1942).
136. Texas Pipe Line Co. v. Ware, 15 F. (2d) 171 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926),
cert. denied 273 U. S. 742, 47 S. Ct. 335, 71 L. Ed. 869 (1926).
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volved in the Ware case have set up no administrative board or
commission. The rights and remedies thereunder are legal rights
and remedies. Recovery of compensation is not confined to Lou-
isiana state courts, but this compensation act gives a transitory
cause of action which may be enforced in the federal courts of
another state. Since the Ware case involved no peculiar state
venue statute, involved no administrative question and involved
no equitable suit, the rule of decision announced by the majority
of the court in the Burford case was not applicable to the Ware
case. The Supreme Court did not owe it to the lower federal
courts to comment on the Ware case, therefore, because it would
not be error, under the state law there involved, for a federal
court to entertain such a suit today.
The conclusion is inescapable, as drawn from these cases,
that doubtless we are well in the beginning of the golden age
of administrative law.137 As contrasted with the long fight for
supremacy between the courts of law and the courts of equity,
instead of curbing the ascendancy of administrative agencies,
our courts of law and equity, especially federal courts, have care-
fully fostered and nurtured it. Based on present administrative
trends and tendencies, we may be the last generation of court-
house lawyers. We may now expect federal courts to evidence a
recessive rather than a dominant attitude in reviewing awards
of workmen's compensation boards. Finally, the rule will be-
since there is no federal constitutional right to a judicial review
of the awards of any and all administrative boards or commis-
sions-that federal judicial review of decrees of administrative
agencies such as workmen's compensation boards is only that as
prescribed and as restricted by the state constitution and by the
legislative branch of the state government. 138
137. Pound, The Challenge of the Administrative Process (1944) 30 A. 3.
A. J. 121.
138. Review at all is one question. Review de novo or partial review is
another. As to the latter, such current state court cases as The California
Co. v. State Oil & Gas Board, 27 So. (2d) 542 (Miss. 1946); 28 So. (2d) 120
(1946); 28 So. (2d) 121 (1946); and Trapp v. Shell Oil Co., Inc., 198 S. W.
(2d) 424 (Tex. S. Ct. 1946); all involving the orders of oil and gas commis-
sions, will receive the attention of future law journals.
